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 LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE: 
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT THE BOY 
SCOUTS OF AMERICA IN ITS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST  
GAY YOUTH MEMBERS 
 
By Sean Griffith, J.D.* 
O n June 9, 2003, the Boy Scouts of America’s (“BSA”) Cradle of Liberty Council released a position statement on its leadership standards stating, “[a]pplications for 
leadership and membership do not inquire into sexual orienta-
tion.  However, an individual who declares himself to be a ho-
mosexual would not be permitted to join Scouting.  All members 
in Scouting must affirm the values of the Scout Oath and Law, 
and all leaders must be able to model those values for youth.”1  
Additionally, the position statement reaffirms that “the Boy 
Scout promises to do his duty to God and to be morally straight, 
as well as to be clean in his thoughts, words and deeds.”2  These 
position statements are a clear indicator that the BSA intends to 
extend its ban on gay leaders to its youth members.3 
The Supreme Court’s existing framework for deciding when 
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination conflicts with a 
private group’s right to associate leaves open a grey area with 
regard to the denial of youths’ membership to the BSA.  The 
BSA’s ban on openly gay youth members likely goes beyond the 
scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, which found that a state could not compel the BSA to 
retain an avowed homosexual as an assistant scoutmaster.4   
This article will argue that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
should extend only to persons in adult leadership positions 
within the BSA and that its current ban on openly gay youth 
members constitutes unacceptable discrimination.  This article 
asserts that states have a compelling interest in preventing the 
discrimination of youth members based on sexual orientation 
that outweighs the BSA’s First Amendment right of expressive 
association.  Finally, a state may have a further compelling inter-
est in protecting youth members of the Boy Scouts from dis-
crimination because of the unique role the group plays in chil-
dren’s education. 
THE SUPREME COURT: WHEN GROUP FREEDOMS    
CONFLICT WITH THE STATE’S INTEREST 
The Supreme Court held that freedom of association is a 
fundamental right that, while not explicitly stated in the Consti-
tution, is protected by the First Amendment.  In protecting this 
right the Supreme Court recognizes two distinct incarnations of 
the freedom to associate.  First, individuals have a freedom of 
intimate association which protects close relationships from gov-
ernment imposition by acting as a “critical buffer between the 
individual and the power of the state.”5  Second, the Supreme 
Court recognized that citizens must have freedom of expressive 
association, which protects First Amendment rights against gov-
ernment intrusion by allowing individuals to unite with others 
holding common views for an expressive purpose.6  This article 
is concerned with the freedom of expressive association. 
Implicit in the freedom to associate is the freedom not to 
associate, which is to say, the freedom to discriminate.7  Con-
versely, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state may have 
a compelling interest in protecting certain classes of people from 
discrimination.8  States have passed public accommodation stat-
utes which prohibit private groups from denying an individual 
access to a public accommodation because of his or her race, sex, 
orientation, or other characteristics.  In Roberts, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that public accommodations laws “plainly 
serve[d] compelling state interests of the highest order,”9 and 
recognized that a state's compelling interest in mandating equal 
access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills 
and business contacts.10  Therefore, because the Supreme Court 
recognizes both a group’s freedom to discriminate and a state’s 
interest in preventing discrimination, the stage is set for conflict.  
In Roberts, Duarte, and New York Club Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court laid the framework for considering how conflicts between 
state interests and group rights should be decided.11  First, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the state’s interest was com-
pelling.  All three cases recognized that states have a compelling 
interest in eliminating public accommodations’ policies which 
discriminated against women.12  Second, the Supreme Court 
asked whether the group in question was an expressive associa-
tion.  In Roberts13 and Duarte,14 the Court found that individuals 
had united to engage in purposeful, protected speech and thus, 
the freedom to associate was implicated.15  Third, the Supreme 
Court asked whether inclusion of the excluded group would bur-
den the group’s messages.  Although no burden was found in 
these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that inclusion of an 
unwanted group could impair the expressive capacity of the asso-
ciation enough to trigger First Amendment protection.16   
In these three cases, the Supreme Court never had to balance 
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination against a private 
group’s First Amendment freedoms because in all three cases, 
the Supreme Court found no burden on First Amendment activ-
ity.17  However, two points are vital to this article.  First, Roberts 
held that the amount of protection the First Amendment offers 
may be conditional.  “The nature and degree of constitutional 
protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending 
on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitution-
ally protected liberty is at stake.”18  Second, even where a court 
recognizes that inclusion of an unwanted group will burden an 
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 association’s ability to express its message, “[t]he right to asso-
ciate for expressive purposes is not, however absolute.  Infringe-
ments on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to 
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less 
restrictive of association freedoms.”19 
DALE: WHEN THE STATE CANNOT FORCE A        
GROUP TO ADMIT A LEADER WHO WOULD              
COMPROMISE EXPRESSION 
James Dale began scouting as an eight year old and attained 
the rank of Eagle Scout at the age of eighteen.  The following 
year he applied for adult membership, and BSA approved him 
for the position of assistant scoutmaster.  During this time Dale 
became the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay 
Alliance and was interviewed by a newspaper regarding his ad-
vocacy for the psychological needs of homosexual teenagers.  
Soon after, Dale received a letter from a BSA executive asking 
him to revoke his adult membership.20  Dale was denied his right 
to attend a hearing to review his case because BSA, “does not 
admit avowed homosexuals to membership in the organiza-
tion.”21   
Consequently, Dale filed a complaint against the BSA, al-
leging that it violated New Jersey’s public accommodations stat-
ute, Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), by revoking his ad-
mittance because of his sexual orientation.22  The BSA success-
fully appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which held that 
applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law to the BSA 
violated its First Amendment right of expressive association.23   
The Supreme Court first considered whether BSA was an 
expressive group, and if so, whether an anti-homosexual mes-
sage was part of its expression, noting that the purpose of BSA 
is to instill values in youths, “by having its adult leaders spend 
time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them” in 
various activities.24  “The scoutmasters and assistant scoutmas-
ters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values – both expressly 
and by example.”25  Thus, the Supreme Court held that BSA is 
an expressive group, with its expression being anti-
homosexuality.26  The Supreme Court held that the judiciary 
may not “reject a group’s expressed values because they dis-
agree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.”27   
If BSA claims to be anti-homosexual, the Court holds, it “cannot 
doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.”28   
Next, the Supreme Court asked, “whether Dale’s presence 
as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy 
Scouts’ desire to not promote homosexual conduct as a legiti-
mate form of behavior.”29  The Court declared, “as we give def-
erence to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its 
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view 
of what would impair its expression.”30  The Court emphasized 
that Dale was a gay activist and his presence as a leader would 
“at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both 
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”31 
The Supreme Court then analogized this case to Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.  In 
Hurley, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) was entitled to 
march because it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose 
in the parade, there was no state action, and the parade was a 
public accommodation.”32  The South Boston Allied War Veter-
ans Council (“Council”) did not wish to exclude GLIB because 
of the orientation of its members, but because it did not want to 
march behind a GLIB banner.  However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Massachusetts Court’s decision finding there was 
no violation of Massachusetts’ public accommodation law by 
the Council in excluding the GLIB from the parade.  The Su-
preme court consistently ruled that GLIB’s presence behind a 
banner would have “interfered with the parade organizers’ 
choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence 
of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere 
with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view 
contrary to its beliefs.”33  Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled 
that requiring BSA to, “retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster 
would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or 
disfavor homosexual conduct.”34 
Finally, the Court considered whether the New Jersey pub-
lic accommodations law requiring that the Boy Scouts accept 
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster interferes with the Scouts’ free-
dom of expressive association.35  Without ruling directly on 
whether BSA was a public accommodation or whether New 
Jersey had a compelling interest, the Court distinguished Dale 
from Duarte, Roberts, and New York State Club Assn.  While 
the Court found a compelling state interest in each of these 
cases, there were no “significant burdens” to expressive associa-
tion and as such, the Supreme Court did not have to balance 
state interests against group rights in any of those cases.36  In 
Dale, however, the Supreme Court had to conduct a balancing 
test because of its finding of a “significant burden” and held that 
the “state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommo-
dations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy 
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”37     
LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE 
Given the BSA’s vocal opposition to gay members as well 
as adult leaders in their position statement of 2003, it is likely 
that they will attempt to bar openly gay youth in the same man-
ner as the ejection of Dale from the BSA.  In doing so, the BSA 
will likely attempt to invoke Dale as extending to openly gay 
youth. 
WHY THE BSA CANNOT DIRECTLY EXTEND DALE TO 
YOUTH MEMBERS 
There are two main reasons why the Supreme Court should 
read Dale as restricted to adult leadership positions, and not 
youth members.  First, the language of every Dale holding spe-
cifically pertains to adult leadership positions.  Second, Dale’s 
critical analogy to Hurley would prove unworkable if it was 
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 meant to apply to youth membership.  Additionally, lower courts 
have reached no consensus on a reading of Dale.38 
In Dale, the Supreme Court determined that BSA was an 
expressive association and that an anti-homosexual message was 
part of their First Amendment protected speech.39  However, in 
the Supreme Court’s examples of how this message was ex-
pressed, it only cited the expressions of adult leadership.  BSA 
wrote that its mission was  
“to instill values in young people… by having its 
adult leaders spend time with the youth members…  
During this time spent with the youth members, the 
scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate 
them with the Boy Scout’s values – both expressly 
and by example.”40   
In every example the Supreme Court offered, the speaker was 
the adult scout leader and the audience was the youth member.  
The Supreme Court did not address the expressive message of 
the individual boy scouts who were “inculcated.”  
Having established that BSA is an expressive group with an 
anti-homosexual message, the Supreme Court then considered 
“whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would 
significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not ‘promote ho-
mosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.’”41  The 
Supreme Court found in the affirmative, finding that allowing 
Dale to continue as a leader would, “force the organization to 
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that 
the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form 
of behavior.”42   The Supreme Court did not rule on whether it 
was Dale’s identity as a gay activist, a gay scout leader, or 
merely self-identification as being gay which would burden the 
BSA’s message.  The Supreme Court only asked whether Dale, 
who was a vocal gay advocate, would burden the Scouts mes-
sage.   
Based on the preceding findings, it seems likely the Su-
preme Court intended a narrow holding.  The language of Dale 
is confined to answering a question about James Dale and possi-
bly adult leadership positions in general, but it never represents 
youth members as speakers.  As such, the holding should be 
limited to vocal gay advocates in positions of adult leadership.  
Rather, the youth members are the intended audience of BSA’s 
speech and message and the Supreme Court does not identify 
any expressive role for them.   
Furthermore, the Dale Court relies greatly on Hurley.  
While the Council stated their reasoning for not admitting the 
GLIB into the parade was because they did not want to march 
behind a banner,43 the Council would not have had power to 
deny admittance to individual homosexuals who wished to 
march.44  If the Dale decision were meant to extend to youth 
members without any contention that youth members expressed 
the BSA’s message, then the Court would be allowing BSA to 
discriminate based only on sexual orientation, which was explic-
itly prohibited in Hurley.45  The analogy between Hurley and 
Dale only works if Dale is read not to implicate youth members. 
 
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST        
FAVORS GAY YOUTH MEMBERS OF THE BSA 
It is important to note the significance of the absence of a 
Supreme Court ruling on whether BSA should be considered a 
public accommodation in Dale.  One of the pre-requisites of a 
violation of the First Amendment right to expressive association 
is state action.  As noted earlier, state public accommodation 
laws circumvent the requirement of state action to apply to pri-
vate groups.46  Because the Supreme Court in Dale declined to 
rule directly on the issue of public accommodation, going di-
rectly to the First Amendment balancing test, it set the precedent 
that a case regarding exclusion of the BSA’s gay youth members 
should be governed by the balancing test. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court would need to conduct a 
balancing test and find that the state’s interests in preventing 
discrimination against children would outweigh the group’s in-
terest in expressive association.  Two factors would weigh in 
favor of the state’s interest in preventing discrimination: inclu-
sion of a gay youth member would be less of a burden than in-
clusion of a gay scout leader;47 and, the state has a recognized 
compelling interest in protecting youths from BSA’s discrimina-
tion because of the unique role it plays in children’s education.48    
The Supreme Court was clear that James Dale was an ex-
pressive agent of the BSA and, like a group holding a banner in 
Hurley, he contributed to the overall message of the organiza-
tion.  While gay adult scout leaders may be denied participation 
in the BSA because they are expressive agents analogous to sign 
holders in Hurley, a youth member is more analogous to the gay 
individual who wishes to march in the parade without a sign.  
Hurley is clear, moreover, that the First Amendment does not 
protect an expressive association’s decision to deny the mere 
presence of an individual based only on his or her orientation.49  
Thus, a person’s presence alone is not expressive.  Just as indi-
vidual gay marchers could not have burdened the Council’s ex-
pression enough to outweigh the commonwealth’s interest in 
preventing discrimination, a BSA youth member’s presence 
alone cannot burden expression enough to outweigh a state’s 
interest in preventing discrimination. 
A state may also have a compelling interest in protecting 
youths from BSA’s discrimination because of the unique role 
the group plays in children’s education.  This compelling inter-
est may outweigh BSA’s freedom of expressive association.  In 
Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, Judge Calabresi writing for a 
unanimous court upholding the state interest in Connecticut’s 
Gay Rights Law over the BSA’s right to associative expression, 
personally noted that,  
“[i]t is possible that, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a state that has adopted a policy of equal pro-
tection with respect to a specific group may have a 
compelling interest in the enforcement of that pol-
icy, even if the federal government has not recog-
nized that same group’s claim to heightened scrutiny 
for the purposes of equal protection…”50   
Merely because the state interest in Dale could not outweigh 
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BSA’s right to expressive association does not mean that other 
states with less restrictive expressive association rights do not 
have a compelling enough state interest to justify the restric-
tions.51 
Not only have courts recognized that states may have a 
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination, but they have 
also acknowledged states’ “compelling interest in educating its 
youth, to prepare them to participate effectively and intelligently 
in our open political system, and to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society.”52  The Boy Scouts prepare 
children to be all of these things during a time when, as the BSA 
proclaims on its web site, nearly one in five children in the 
United States lives in poverty.53   
In programs like “Scoutreach,” the BSA “targets youth in 
distressed areas of [the U.S.], where they have many chances to 
fail, and few opportunities to succeed, much less to excel.”  The 
BSA tries to help the many children in the United States who 
struggle with the issues of “[s]ingle parent families, often 
headed by mothers and grandmothers, unemployment, a pattern 
of alcohol and drug abuse and family income below the poverty 
line.”54  Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) explains that 
the Boy Scouts is, “America's number one values program for 
youth.  Scouting helps strengthen character, develops good citi-
zenship, and enhances both mental and physical fitness among 
its participants. Scouting has helped countless youths from bro-
ken families by providing them with the moral discipline and 
leadership they would have otherwise lacked.”55  
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the state’s interest in preventing discrimi-
nation, children are easily distinguishable from grown men.  
James Dale was a grown man.  The educational needs, identity 
formation, and self-esteem of an adult is not comparable to a 
child, who is just developing a sense of self and habits for suc-
cess.  The balancing test the Supreme Court should engage in is 
not simply between the interests of a private group and the state, 
but between the irrefutable needs of children and a group’s inter-
est in an untrammeled message.  Each year, the Boy Scouts pro-
vide stability, discipline, and community to hundreds of thou-
sands of youths, helping them become successful adults.   
If a case based on the BSA’s exclusion of gay youth is 
raised, the Supreme Court should address the interests of the 
children.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court should find not only 
that Dale does not extend to the non-leadership positions in the 
BSA, but also that a state has a compelling interest in the rearing 
of its children that outweighs whatever burden a gay youth 
member could place on the message of the nation-wide Boy 
Scouts of America.    
